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Abstract
This study examines the effect of current asset tunneling on firm performance from the emerging
market perspective. Although tunneling activities is a common practices by businesses especially
in Indonesia, there exist obstacles in the measurement of tunneling activity because it is difficult
to proof the existence of such practices. In this study, we measure tunneling by using accounts
receivables and develop tunneling detection criteria. In addition, this study examines the effect of
tunneling on firm performance and market reaction during the announcement of the related party
transaction. The study finds that from the perspective of the being-tunneled companies, receivables
to related parties negatively affect the company’s profit margin. Companies which announce related
party transaction indicating tunneling obtain negative abnormal return during the announcement of
the related party transaction.
Keywords: current asset tunneling, related party transaction, firm performance, emerging market

Abstrak
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh tunneling aset lancar pada kinerja perusahaan pada perspektif
negara berkembang. Meskipun aktivitas tunneling terjadi dalam praktik bisnis di Indonesia, tetapi
terdapat kesulitan untuk mengukurnya karena aktivitas tunneling sulit dibuktikan. Penelitian ini
membangun kriteria deteksi tunneling. Penelitian ini juga menguji pengaruh tunneling pada kinerja
perusahaan dan reaksi pasar modal pada saat pengumuman transaksi pihak berelasi. Penelitian
ini menemukan bahwa dari perspektif perusahaan yang di-tunnel, piutang kepada pihak berelasi
berpengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Perusahaan yang mengumumkan transaksi pihak
berelasi yang terindikasi tunneling mendapatkan return negatif.
Kata kunci: current asset tunneling, related party transaction, firm performance, emerging
market

INTRODUCTION
Tunneling is a transfer of resources out
of the company for the benefit of controlling
shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000). In
a concentrated ownership structure, the

controlling shareholders might take advantage
of their control to expropriate minority
shareholders’ wealth (La Porta et al. 2000;
Shleifer and Vishny 1997), through activities
such as tunneling. Controlling shareholders
have the power to set corporate policy to obtain
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benefits from the related party transaction.
Some empirical evidences have suggested
that related party transactions can be used
for expropriation through tunneling activities
(Aharony et al. 2010; Berkman et al. 2009;
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a; Gao
and Kling 2008; Jian and Wong 2003; Juliarto
et al. 2013).
As to date, most of the studies undertaken
on expropriation focus mainly on tunneling
activities in countries with high levels of
corporate governance and developed countries
(Bae et al. 2002; Faccio and Stolin 2006;
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a).
However, in developing counties, such
tunneling receives little attention (Juliarto
et al. 2013). Tunneling can occur in country
with high and low levels of corporate
governance (Johnson et al. 2000). Nenova
(2003) states that controlling shareholders in
companies operating in countries with a low
level of corporate governance policies have
more chances to expropriate the minority
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, our study
focuses on the expropriation1 of noncontrolling
shareholders through tunneling activity
in countries with low levels of corporate
governance and emerging economy.
Indonesia is an interesting case to be
examined for this research considering
governance issues, such as related party
lending and crony capitalism. It is one of the
institutional problems behind the 1997 Asian
crisis. Moreover, Indonesia is a developing
country having such characteristics low level
of investor protection, low law enforcement,
and group structures. These characteristics
lead to related party transactions that could
benefit the group members and at the end will
destroy the value of the firm (Khanna and
Palepu 2000).
One of the obstacles in studying
tunneling activities is the difficulty to measure
them. Although these activities are occurring
in business practices, it is difficult to prove
Expropriation is defined as the process of using one’s
control powers to maximize own welfare and redistribute wealth from others (Claessens et al. 2000b).
1
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them. It is not surprising that most previous
studies of tunneling focused on market
reactions at the time of the announcements of
related party transactions (Bae et al. 2002;
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a;
Faccio and Stolin 2006; Peng et al. 2011) or
used the level of related party transactions
as a proxy for tunneling (Gao and Kling
2008; Juliarto et al. 2013). The usage of the
level of related party transactions to measure
tunneling is problematic because companies
conduct related party transactions not only for
opportunistic reasons but also for efficiency
reasons. It is for this reason that, in this study
we develop tunneling detection criteria.
The following is an illustration of
a tunneling activity using related party
transactions that could decrease company’s
financial performance. Public company in
Indonesia, namely MI2 in this case is
considered to be performing tunneling activity
in the form of coal price manipulation by KC.
KC employs a special purpose company that is
RL in Cayman Island to transfer profits. Here
is the structure of corporate ownership:
KC and RL are subsidiaries of MI. GB is
the ultimate owner3 of MI. KC does not sell
coal directly to potential buyers; instead, they
sell it to RL below market price, thus causes a
decline in KC earnings. Then, RL resells the
coal at market price to potential buyers, thereby
increasing profits to RL. In this case, KC is
tunneled company. Local Government K, KC
non-controlling shareholder, is harmed by the
transaction. While the controlling shareholder
(GB) as a whole benefits from the transaction,
due to losses incurred in KC, it can be covered
by higher profits in RL. These transactions are
classified as cash flow tunneling because: (1)
the transaction leads to a transfer of resources
out of the firm in the form of liquid assets; and
Code for ethical purpose
Ultimate owners concept consider direct and indirect
ownership in public companies. Direct ownership is the
percentage of shares owned by shareholders on behalf
of him. Indirect ownership is ownership through the
ownership chain. With ultimate ownership, major shareholders are traced in the major shareholders, and so on,
until ultimate owners are identified.
2
3
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Figure 1
Illustration of Tunneling Activity
Source: Announcements of Affiliation and Conflict of Interest Transactions, Capital Market and Financial Institutions Regulatory
Bodies 2009

(2) the transaction is beneficial to controlling
shareholders at the expense of non-controlling
shareholders. Cash flow tunneling transaction
can also be employed as tax avoidance because
it is a way to tunnel profits from Indonesia to
Cayman Island which is a tax heaven country.
The motivation of controlling shareholders to
transfer profit from KC to RL is because their
cash flow right in RL is greater than in KC. A
cash flow right is financial claim of controlling
shareholders to the company (La Porta et al.
1999).
Almost all public companies in Indonesia
perform related party transactions (Sari 2013).
Indonesia has group structure and low levels
of law enforcement. These leads to abusive
related party transactions which will benefit
group members while at the end destroy the
value of the firm (Khanna and Palepu 2000).
Poor law enforcement in Indonesia makes
tunneling cases untouched by the law (Sari
2013). If not controlled, tunneling can lead to

reduction in investor confidence and financial
crisis as it happened in the Asian financial
crisis 1997.
Cheung et al. (2006), Cheung et al.
(2009b) and Jian and Wong (2003) found
that there were several ways for companies
to conduct tunneling through related party
transactions. For example, a company
can provide a great number of accounts
receivables, long credit periods, warranty to
related party’s receivables, or writes-off of
related party receivables. A receivable given to
a related party can be treated as a put option,
in which a related party can exercise such an
option by not paying the receivable in a bad
situation (Atanasov et al. 2008). Provision
and elimination of related party loans will, in
effect, decrease a company’s net earnings. The
focus of this study is to examine the tunneling
hypothesis whether a receivable to a related
party is employed as a tunnel to transfer
resource out from the company which hampers
company’s performance.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The theory used to explain the occurrence
of tunneling activity is the agency theory. In
this theory, a concentrated ownership structure
– a common phenomenon in many companies
around the world – has been suggested as one
of the leading indicators of an agency problem
between controlling and non-controlling
shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). In this process, the controlling
shareholders might take advantage of their
control to expropriate non-controlling’s wealth.
Expropriation of non-controlling shareholders by the controlling shareholders is
principal agency conflict in the concentrated
ownership company. Expropriation arises when
there is a separation of cash flow rights and
control rights. A cash flow right is a financial
claim of shareholders to the company (La Porta
et al. 1999). Control rights are voting rights to
participate in determining the company’s key
policies (La Porta et al. 1999). The incentive
and ability to perform such expropriation will
be greater if the controlling shareholders have
control rights in excess of the cash flow (Gugler
and Yurtoglu 2003). Cash flow rights leverage
on controlling shareholders leading to high
likelihood of agency conflicts. A cash flow
right leverage is a deviation between cash flow
rights with the rights of control. The increase in
control right over cash flow rights is performed
by controlling shareholders through a variety
of mechanisms such as pyramid holdings,
cross-ownership (La Porta et al. 1999). The
ability of the controlling shareholders to use
cash flow rights leverage to expropriate even
greater if the controlling shareholder is also
involved in management. Controlling shareholder
involvement in management causes it not only
able to influence the policy of the company, but
also to have flexibility to use the right control
for the private benefit (La Porta et al. 1999).
Tunneling is generally defined as the agency
problem between a controlling shareholder and
minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders
can implement policies that benefit them at
the expense of minority shareholders (La
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Porta et al. 2000) through contractual policies
with related parties i.e. tunneling (Gilson and
Gordon 2003). Tunneling is divided into two
types:
1. Controlling shareholder can move resources
from the company to its interests through
self-dealing transaction. The transaction
either illegal or fraud. Examples of selfdealing transaction are sales of assets
through contracts such as transfer pricing
that benefit the controlling shareholders,
excessive executive compensation, loan
guarantees to related parties, etc.
2. Controlling shareholders can increase their
ownership in the company without giving/
transfer of assets through dilutive share
issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading,
creeping acquisitions and other transactions
that harm noncontrolling shareholders.
Atanasov et al. (2008) divide tunneling
into three types of equity tunneling, asset
tunneling and cash flow tunneling: (1) Equity
tunneling increases the controller’s share
of the firm but does not directly affect the
firm’s productive assets. Examples of equity
tunneling are dilutive offerings, freeze-outs
of minority shareholders, and insider trading;
(2) Asset tunneling comprises the transfer of
productive, long-term tangible or intangible
assets from the firm to the related party for
less than market values, such that the transfer
has a permanent effect on firm operations; (3)
Cash flow tunneling is transfer cash flow out
from the company, including transfer pricing
(sale of outputs to related party below-market
prices; or purchase of inputs from related
party at above-market prices) and excessive
executive salaries or perquisite consumption.
Companies conduct related party
transactions for three motives; to minimize
transaction costs (Cook 1977; Fisman and
Khanna 1998), to manipulate earnings (Jian
and Wong 2003; Aharony et al. 2010), and
to tunnel or prop-up (Cheung et al. 2009a;
Cheung et al. 2009b; Cheung et al. 2006;
Juliarto et al. 2013). Tunneling results in
transactions that are a priori likely to result in
expropriation of minority shareholders such as
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asset transactions, trading relationship, equity
transactions, account receivables or loan
guaranties (Cheung et al. 2009a). Propping are
transactions likely to benefit the listed firm’s
minority shareholders such as cash receipts by
the listed company (Cheung et al. 2009a).
Some studies indicate that related party
transaction is used for tunneling purposes. Jian
and Wong (2003) found that the company uses
receivables to related parties as a tunnel to
transfer resources out of the company. Cheung
et al. (2009b) find empirical evidence that the
sale and purchase of assets to related party are
used to perform tunneling. Asset tunneling
occurs when the firm acquires assets from
related parties at above market prices or sell
asset to related parties at below market prices.
Receivables to related party transaction
can be used to conduct tunneling (Cheung et
al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a). Jian and Wong
(2003) state that there are two ways to do
tunneling. First, the company provides a high
accounts receivable or long credit period to the
related party when selling the product. Second,
the company provides the loan to the related
party (in the financial statements included in
other receivables post). A loan to controlling
shareholders and affiliates is one way of
controlling shareholders to transfer resources
to their interests.
Jian and Wong (2003) find empirical
evidence that when firms have high free
cash flows, they will tunnel the excess of
such resources for the benefit of controlling
shareholders through the provision of credits.
Aharony et al. (2010) provide empirical
evidence on tunneling activities in China
through a credit transaction to related parties
after the IPO. Receivables to related parties
can also be understood as a put option; related
parties can exercise such option by not paying
their loan in a bad state (Atanasov et al. 2008).
Jian and Wong (2003) and Aharony et al.
(2010) find empirical evidence that companies
that have excess resources will transfer some
of the resources for the benefit of controlling
shareholders through related party receivables.
We predict that receivables to related parties as
a tunnel transfer resources for the benefit of the

controlling shareholders. If credit to related
party is used for tunneling, the company will
provide a larger loan to related parties. In
addition, the company will provide credits
to related parties at lower interest rates than
market rates. Providing credits to related party
under the market interest rate will decrease
net earnings. Also, warranties and write-offs
of related party receivables will negatively
affect company profits. Lo et al. (2010) found
that tunneling through unfair transaction
decrease being-tunneled profit. Utama and
Utama (2009) that the stock price reaction (as
measured by CAR) for RPT is lower than that
for Non-RPT.
H1: Receivables to related party negatively
affect performance of tunneled
company.
Companies that conduct related party
transactions considered as tunneling have
values decreased at the announcement
of the transaction (Cheung et al. 2006;
Cheung et al. 2009a). It has been found
that market participants react negatively to
announcements of related party transactions
which have indications of tunneling (Bae et
al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al.
2009a; Faccio and Stolin 2006; Peng et al.
2011). Previous studies found that minority
shareholders experienced large value of losses
after the announcements of such related party
transactions by publicly listed firms, which led
to a suggestion of expropriation of minority
shareholders.
H2: There is negative abnormal return
during the announcement of the
tunneling transactions for the tunneled
company.
METHODOLOGY
The observation periods applied in this
study were from 2009-2011. The lists of
the companies were obtained from the IDX
Fact Books 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Indonesia
Stock Exchange 2009; 2010; 2011). There
were nine industry classifications of listed
companies on the IDX. In this study, finance
classified companies that were listed on the
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IDX during 2009 to 2011 were excluded since
they were subjects to specific financial sector
regulations, and hence were not attuned to other
companies in the other eight classifications
(i.e. agriculture; mining; basic industry
and chemicals; miscellaneous industry;
consumer goods industry; property, real estate
and building construction; infrastructure,
utilities and transportation; trade, services
and investment). There were 399, 407, and
428 companies listed on the IDX during
2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively. After the
exclusion of the finance-classified companies,
the remaining listed companies, which were
used in this study, were 332, 338, and 357
during 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively.
Data were obtained from annual reports
and announcements of affiliations and conflicts
of interest transactions from Capital Market and
Financial Institutions Regulatory Bodies. Data
were obtained from capital market regulatory
body database, IDX websites and on the listed
companies’ websites. Announcements of
affiliation and conflict of interest transaction
reports includes detail information on affiliate
and conflicts of interest transactions such as
objects of transactions, transaction values,
transaction dates, announcement dates, and
description of the relationship between two
parties. Daily stock price data were obtained
from Realtime Data Investment (RTI) at the
Economics and Business Faculty, Gadjah
Mada University.
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Variables and Measurement
The dependent variable of this study is
net profit margin. Account receivables which
are provided to related parties with soft credit
terms (i.e. below market interest rates and
longer loan period) have negative impacts on
net income. Moreover, uncollectible related
party receivables will also impact on the
company’s net profit.
The independent variable is account
receivables resulting from related party
transactions. Related party transaction is a
transfer of resources, services or obligations
between a reporting entity with related parties,
regardless of whether or not there is a price
that is charged (IAI 2010).
Net receivables are the differences
between accounts receivable and account
payables. Cheung et al. (2009a) classifies
accounts receivable to related party as tunneling
transactions while account payables on related
party as propping transactions. Direct cash
payments by the listed firm to related parties
are almost certainly tunneling. Receivables
to related party transactions are associated
with negative market reactions on average.
On the other hand, when firms receive direct
cash infusions or loan guarantees from their
controlling shareholders, they are likely to be
benefiting from these transactions. Firms that
receive cash assistance from related parties
earn highly positive and significant excess
returns. These transactions are classified as
propping (Cheung et al. 2009a).

Table 1
Measurement of Account Receivables to Related Parties

171

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Desember 2014, Vol. 11, No. 2, hal 165 - 176

Hence, net receivables measure how more
likely companies do tunneling than propping.
Positive net receivables show that account
receivables are greater than account payables,
meaning that the company has a higher
propensity to do tunneling than propping.
Tunneling Detection Criteria
To test Hypothesis 2, we develop
tunneling detection criteria to identify which
related party transactions are classified as
tunneling activities and which are not. Related
party transactions are categorized as tunneling
based on the following characteristics:
a. There are indications that related party
transaction is for tunneling purposes.
Cheung et al. (2006) and Cheung et al.
(2009b) found that asset transactions, cash
payments, receivable transactions, loan
guarantees, and trading transactions to
related parties had high tendencies toward
tunneling activities. These transactions
could be used to tunnel resources out to its
related parties through unfair pricing, and
thus lowering the value of the company at
the expense of minority shareholders.
b. There is a similarity of controlling owners4
between company and related party.
Goranova (2007) found that the controlling
owner will transfer resources from the
company’s low cash flow rights into the
company’s high cash flow rights.
c. It has similar directors and commissioners
for the company and the related party.
Similar key management personnel provide
the opportunity of using power to regulate
the financial policies and operations, so as
to obtain benefits from such activities.
d. There are family relationships between
company and related party. Identification for
family relationship transactions obtain from
announcements of affiliations and conflicts
of interest transactions from Capital Market
The controlling shareholder (controlling shareholder)
is an individual, a family, or institution that has control
of a company either directly or indirectly on the cutoff level (cut-off) certain control rights (Claessens et al.
2000b). The controlling shareholder is also known as
the greatest ultimate owner.
4

and Financial Institutions Regulatory
Bodies. This report allows us to identify the
ultimate ownership (see Figure 1 and Figure
2) and the relationship between related
parties. A public company is categorized
as a company controlled by a family if the
largest shareholder is an individual or family
at the level of certain control rights. La
Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000a),
and Faccio and Stolin (2006) identify
families based on common last names and
relationships of marriages. Company policy
can be influenced by the family.
e. These transactions are not considered by
the Office of Appraisal Services. Office
of Appraisal Services is engaged in the
valuation of the property/assets.
Empirical Model
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the following
equation, where NPM is net profit margin, IP is
industry performance, IT is industry type, and
AR is account receivables to related party.
NPM = α11 + α12AR + α13IP + α14IT +e …… (1)
In order for us to test for Hypothesis 2,
we determine whether a certain RPT can be
classified as tunneling using the tunneling
detection criteria. Then, we measure abnormal
return around the announcement of tunneling
transaction in which return expectations are
calculated using the mean-adjusted model as
follows:

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Analysis made for the period of 2009 to
2011 on the IDX websites and on the listed
companies’ websites found announcements of
affiliation and conflict of interest transactions
made or related to 74 companies. Assessments
based on the tunneling detection criteria showed
55 transactions which were indicated as asset
tunneling transactions, 3 transactions which
were indicated as equity tunneling transactions
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and 16 transactions which appeared to be
propping transactions5. This study focuses
on current asset tunneling, and therefore, 27
being-tunneled companies were included for
further analysis. Descriptive statistics for the
companies based on the tunneling model used
in this study are presented in Table 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, from the
perspective of the tunneled companies,
receivables to related parties negatively affect
the performance of the company. The empirical
results of equation 1-6 are reported in Table 3.
In the first model, receivables to related
party are negative and significant at 1% alpha.
In the second model, net-receivables of related
party transaction are negative and significant
at alpha 1%. The test results show that firms
which have account receivables greater than
account payables will decrease the company’s
performance. In the third measurement, change
receivables to related parties are negative and
significant coefficient on alpha 1%. The test
results show that firms in the period t gives
receivables greater than the previous period
(t-1) will decrease the company’s net profit
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margin. Empirical evidence, as shown in Table
1, shows that hypothesis 1 is supported that
receivables to related parties negatively affect
the company’s net profit margin.
This finding is consistent with Bertrand
et al. (2002) and Cheung et al. (2006), which
found that companies experienced decreasing
profitability when they performed tunneling
transactions such as provisions of credits to
related parties.
Analysis made for the period of 2009 to
2011 on the IDX websites and on the listed
companies’ websites found announcements of
affiliation and conflict of interest transactions
made by 74 companies. Assessments based
on the tunneling detection criteria showed 27
transactions were identified as current asset
tunneling, such as elimination of related party
transactions to related parties (9 transactions),
receivable to related parties (10 transactions),
and warranty account receivables (8
transactions).
Companies which announce current
asset tunneling transaction obtain negative
abnormal return (AR) negative at the time of

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Tunneled Companies
Variable
Return on Assets

Mean
0.89

Max
40.56

Min
-0.08

Median
0.07

SD
5.6

Net Profit Margin

0.06

0.29

-0.56

0.006

0.14

Table 3
The Influence of Related Party Transaction on Financial Performance
Model 1
-0.826***

Model 2
-0.943***

Model 3
-0.047*

Model 4
-0.127***

Model 5
-0.149***

Model 6
-0.060***

33.484**

33.493**

32.787**

33.376**

33.643**

34.065**

Industry Type

12.256***

11.701***

-4.442**

13.032***

-4.624**

-4.405**

R

4.6%

4.4%

1.4%

5%

4.9%

3.3%

Receivables to
Related Party
Transaction (RPT)
Industry Performance
2

*** significant at alpha 1%, ** significant at alpha 5%, * significant at alpha 10%
5

Propping transactions are transactions that are seemingly beneficial for minority shareholders, although
their real benefits are difficult to judge since the nature
of the transactions are often concealed.

announcement of the transaction to the period
of the window (-3, +3).
On the average, during the window period
(-3, +3), current asset tunneling obtains mean
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Table 4
Cumulative Abnormal Return at the Time of Announcement of Receivables to Related
Party 2009-2010
Transaction
CURRENT ASSET TUNNELING:
1 Elimination of related party receivables
2 Account receivables to related party
3 Warranty account receivables

adjusted abnormal return negative. Elimination
of related party receivables obtains a mean
adjusted abnormal return of -0.66%, account
receivables to related parties gain -6.7% and
warranty account receivables from related
parties obtain -1.2%. This result is consistent
with H2.
Based on the tunneling detection criteria,
the following are examples of transactions
which are indicated as current asset tunneling.
The researchers used the code for ethical
reasons. A public company in Indonesia, namely
PT ED through DD conduct transactions with

Mean Adjusted, (-3,+3)
-0,00669
-0,06755
-0,01284

MM, family GQ as controlling shareholder of
PT ED and MM. Figure 2 shows the nature of
the related party transactions of PT ED/DD
with MM.
PT ED and MM have the same
commissioners
and
directors.
The
commissioners and directors are family
members of the controlling shareholders.
On June 26, 2009, through the subsidiary
of PT ED, DD, has signed a purchase agreement
with MM to take over 99.9% of DTA and
99.9% of the DTI. PT ED also pays off the
entire debt of DTA and the DTI to MM. Total

Family GQ
100%

100%

SC

EC
60,6%

MIN

COD
0,9

Public

ECE

ST

10%

39,4%

36,76

11,65%

90%

50,7%

PT ED

MM

DTA

Transaction

DD

DTI

Figure 2
Ownership Structure PT ED

Source: Announcements of Affiliation and Conflict of Interest Transactions, Capital Market and Financial
Institutions Regulatory Bodies 2009
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amount of the transaction and subrogation
agreed was US$ 886,013 in which US$ 75,122
was used to buy shares of DTA and DTI and
a total of US$ 810,891 was used to repay the
debt of DTA and the DTI to MM.
Family GQ had 100% cash flow rights
in MM and 50.7% cash flow rights in PT ED.
Cash flow rights of controlling shareholders
were greater in MM than in a public company
(PT ED). The difference in cash flow rights was
an incentive for companies to tunnel resources
out from PT ED to MM.
Based on tunneling detection criteria,
transaction of PT ED was indicated as current
asset tunneling. Indicators are:
1. There was a negative abnormal return
during the announcement of the transaction
(-0.01079). Tunneled company and minority
shareholders suffered losses as a result of
the transaction.
2. Debt payment for related party credit
and purchase share of loss that company
owned by related parties were classified as
tunneling (Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al.
2009b).
3. There were similarity of controlling
shareholders between companies and
related parties. PT ED and MM/DTI/DTA
are owned by the same owner, GQ.
4. Both companies have same key management
personal.
The information to develop tunneling
detection criteria were obtained from
announcements of affiliation and conflict of
interest transaction. However, disclosures
contained in the notes to the financial statements
of company PT ED did not provide clear and
detailed information about the relationships
between the company and its related parties,
the ultimate ownership structures of the
companies involved in this transaction and the
detailed description of the transaction. Low
quality of disclosure led to a high likelihood of
abusive related party transactions.
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CONCLUSION
This study found the expropriation
phenomenon through contractual policies
with other parties, whereas past research
focused on expropriation through operations
policies. Expropriation can occur through
related party transactions. This study found
empirical evidence that account receivables
to related party can be used as a tunnel to
transfer resources out of the company to the
controlling’s interests at the expense of minority
shareholders. Tunneled companies will
experience a decrease in financial and market
performances. These results are consistent with
the phenomenon of expropriation of minority
shareholders through contractual policies.
Controlling shareholders in companies
operating in countries with a low level of
investor protection policies have more chances
to expropriate the minority shareholders’
wealth (Nenova 2003). The overall finding
of this study indicates that tunneling occurs
at companies in countries with low levels of
investor protection. Moreover, disclosures
of related party transaction are prepared in
a minimal way. Disclosures of related party
transactions are set forth in PSAK No. 7 of
2010. However, the level of compliance with
mandatory disclosures of public companies in
Indonesia on the financial statement items is
still low, especially in the case of disclosure of
related party transactions (Khomsiyah 2005).
There are some implications that can be
gained from this study, especially for capital
market regulators who could play a significant
role in improving disclosures through more
effective regulation and for potential investors,
for accountants and executives who have
significant roles in enhancing the knowledge
of companies in the areas disclosures and
tunneling. The limitations of this study that
should be considered is sample used in this
study are limited, and hence the generalizability
of the findings should be treated cautiously.
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